Its time to take control yourself

Some Firms Suspend Their 401(k) Match

As the economy worsens, a growing number of small businesses are suspending their 401(k) match, and, in some instances, closing the retirement plans altogether.

While only about 15% to 20% of small businesses offer a 401(k) plan, many added them in recent years to attract and retain workers and to help business owners save for retirement. But the economic downturn and higher health-insurance costs are forcing companies to cut back on retirement benefits.

“It’s a cash-flow issue,” says Patrick M. Shelton, a partner at Benefit Plans Plus LLC, a third-party administrator of retirement plans in St. Louis. “The companies don’t have money to meet payroll and medical insurance, so they’re cutting back on 401(k) plans.”

The small business market — companies with fewer than 500 workers — had been one of the fastest-growing segments of the defined-contribution market.

‘Critical’ Benefit

A 2007 survey of small businesses by Fidelity Investments found the plans were very important to workers. Almost 70% of the employees said a retirement plan “was critical or very important for businesses to attract and retain employees.” The study also found that 49% of employees who had retirement plans said they wouldn’t move to companies without them.

But as the economy has worsened, more businesses have changed their retirement plans. “We’re definitely seeing that small business exit, and we expect to see it continue through 2009,” says Mr. Shelton of Benefit Plans Plus. “I think the first six months of next year will be off for everyone.”

Mr. Shelton says he has seen 12 plans terminated in 2008 compared with six for all of 2007. The hardest-hit companies are those in the housing-construction, mortgage and trucking industries.

Wells Fargo & Co. also has seen a slight increase in small business 401(k) plan closings.

“It’s not a huge or significant increase, but it’s more than we consider normal,” says Laurie Nordquist, executive vice president Wells Fargo Institutional Trust Services. She says the trend was apparent at the beginning of the year, “even before we had the equity-market volatility in September and October.” In some instances, the companies are closing the plans because of a reduced work force.

“We are seeing a slight uptick in plan terminations by businesses who can’t afford the plans or are going out of business,” says Laurie J. Shultz, vice president, Emerging Markets Segment for the Retirement and Investor Services division of Principal Financial Group Inc.

“The businesses only have so much money for benefits,” she says. “The No. 1 benefit for attracting and retaining employees is medical benefits.”

Ms. Shultz says it’s much more common to see a business suspend the match than close the plan. The current economy could result in a slowdown in the creation of new plans. Ms. Shultz says there’s no change currently “in new startup plans, but what we are seeing in our pipeline is a slight downturn.”

Saving Money

Many more companies, large and small, are opting to suspend the company match this year to save money, including General Motors Corp. and Ford Motor Co., which recently announced they would eliminate the 401(k) match for salaried workers.

A survey released in October by consulting firm Watson Wyatt found that 2% of employers already have reduced their 401(k) or 403(b) match. An additional 4% plan to take the action in the next 12 months.

Shaun T. King, an investment adviser at Hickok & Boardman Retirement Solutions in Burlington, Vt., says, “We’re definitely seeing companies cut back on the amount of the match they put in.”

Companies, he says, are looking at ways to decrease costs. But once a 401(k) plan is set up, he says, most of the cost can be shifted to the employees.

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IRA Private Equity investing, News Financial Intelligence, TIC Investing, The Book Online | No Comments » November 13th, 2008

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Hedge-fund and George Soros

WASHINGTON – Hedge-fund managers are defending their industry at a congressional hearing Thursday, testifying that hedge funds didn’t cause the current economic crisis and some saying they shouldn’t be subject to stricter regulation in the future.

[George Soros] Reuters

Hedge fund manager George Soros is sworn in to testify.

However, experts on a panel of witnesses argued that regulators need to tighten oversight of the $2 trillion industry, with one calling for tax increases on the industry.

“When hedge funds become too big to fail, that poses a problem for the financial system,” said Andrew Lo, Director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for Financial Engineering.

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D., Calif.) called the hearing to examine the role of hedge funds in the financial markets. He invited five hedge fund managers who earned an average of $1 billion last year.

In opening remarks, Waxman called hedge funds “virtually unregulated” and noted that the industry has swelled over the last decade. “Regulators aren’t even certain how many hedge funds exist or how much money they control,” he said.

Rep. Tom Davis of Virginia, the ranking Republican on the panel, said hedge fund losses are more an effect, rather than a cause, of the financial crisis. But he predicted that the lightly regulated investment pools would now endure more scrutiny from investors and regulators.

“Going forward, hedge funds will have to take account of a reduced tolerance by investors and governments for an unregulated parallel financial universe of exotic derivatives run by faceless quants that exerts unpredictable gravitational forces on the marketplace,” Mr. Davis said in opening remarks.

Mr. Lo said hedge funds should be required to file confidential reports to regulators detailing their positions, and he urged Congress to create a financial-wreckage squad to issue public findings on the causes of market failings, similar to reports on plane crashes.

Hedge fund managers defended their industry, pointing to other causes of the financial stress.

James Simons, chairman of Renaissance Technologies LLC, blamed regulators who took a “hands-off position” toward investment banks and credit default swaps, a kind of insurance against defaults by borrowers. He said credit-rating agencies were at fault for giving high ratings to shaky investments. He maintains that hedge funds weren’t part of the problem.

Hedge funds, which are lightly regulated investment pools for wealthy individuals and institutions, “did not cause the financial crisis and are in fact helping to mitigate its damage,” saving taxpayers’ money, according to testimony by Houman Shadab, a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

He said tightening regulation on hedge funds now could increase economic instability, making matters worse.

But former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman David Ruder, now a Northwestern University Law School professor, called for closer regulation of hedge funds, and some hedge fund managers agreed.

Harbinger Capital Partners Fund co-founder and Senior Managing Director Philip Falcone said he supports more public disclosure by hedge funds and the creation of a public clearing house for derivatives trading, particularly in credit default swaps.

Citadel Investment Group CEO Kenneth Griffin endorsed the clearing house approach, saying it is a “straightforward solution” to the lack of information on such swaps and would “dramatically reduce systemic risk.”

Committee Democrats criticized the tax rates paid by hedge fund managers, an issue that dominated the congressional debate over tax reform last year.

Mr. Waxman, whose panel doesn’t have jurisdiction over tax matters, said hedge funds receive tax breaks that “allow them to treat the vast majority of their income as capital gains.”

Rep. Elijah Cummings (D., Md.) said, “I hope we can correct this injustice once and for all next year.”

Managers of a broad array of partnerships pay capital gains rates, rather than ordinary income rates as high as 35%, on a portion of their pay, dubbed “carried interest.”

For private equity managers who often make longer-term investments, the 15% long-term capital gains rate generally applies. However, hedge fund managers are more likely to hold investments for less than one year. Ordinary income rates apply to such investments.

Stanford law professor Joseph Bankman argued that the taxation of carried interest was neither fair nor efficient.

Billionaire investor George Soros presented a blow-by-blow account of the financial crisis and offered a bleak outlook for the economy. “A deep recession is inevitable and the possibility of a depression cannot be ruled out,” he said. Mr. Soros argued that the events of recent months undercut what he called the prevailing theory of markets — that they always return to equilibrium and that deviations are caused by random, external events.

Mr. Soros said the current crisis wasn’t caused by an outside shock, such as a surge in energy prices, but by the financial system itself. He argued that a flawed theory of markets had been used to justify unbridled free-market capitalism and deregulation. He described his own theory, dubbed reflexivity. It says that financial markets present a distorted view of underlying reality, which affects market prices.

Write to Judith Burns at judith.burns@dowjones.com and Jessica Holzer at jessica.holzer@dowjones.com

Hedge Funds | No Comments » November 13th, 2008

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Derivatives

Derivatives 2008
Derivatives are complex contracts that bet on future events and for which the seller of the contract is paid a premium or recurring premiums by the buyer in exchange for the promise that the seller will pay the buyer should a described event occur. The common feature of a derivative is that it is not a claim on actual assets or commodities.
A CDS (Credit Default Swap) is a typical form of derivative and there are about $62 trillion in nominal (face) value of these outstanding. Derivatives are used for hedging, speculation, and arbitrage. There are private, OTC (Over-The-Counter), and Exchange-Traded Derivatives and they are used for 1) futures and forwards, 2) options (puts/calls), and 3) swaps, among other dubious “financial innovations.”

When you buy a derivative you are buying a contract that is similar to an insurance policy. Unlike a futures contract in which you agree to pay a certain price for future delivery of gold, corn, or whatever, nothing is ever delivered in a derivatives contract - except a payment from the seller of the contract to the buyer should the contract described event happen such as the default of a particular bond. Derivatives are essentially just highly speculative bets that are not secured by anything tangible and this is what makes then so dangerous and volatile - especially in highly volatile markets.

The Wikipedia definition of Derivatives is as follows:

“Derivatives are financial instruments whose values depend on the value of other underlying financial instruments. The main types of derivatives are futures, forwards, options, and swaps.

The main use of derivatives is to reduce risk for one party. The diverse range of potential underlying assets and pay-off alternatives leads to a wide range of derivatives contracts available to be traded in the market. Derivatives can be based on different types of assets such as commodities, equities (stocks), bonds, interest rates, exchange rates, or indexes (such as a stock market index, consumer price index (CPI) — see inflation derivatives — or even an index of weather conditions, or other derivatives). Their performance can determine both the amount and the timing of the pay-offs.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derivative_(finance)

The single biggest problem with derivatives is that most all derivatives contracts are UNLISTED PRIVATE CONTRACTS BETWEEN COUNTERPARTIES and there is thus no way to establish “market value” of derivatives. They are not trades on exchanges and are essential subjectively valued “Level 3″ assets that only have value if another party can be found to buy them. If derivatives were required to be STANDARDIZED AND LISTED ON OTC EXCHANGES they would not be such a danger to the economic system as there would be “market value” and they would become much more “fungible” like commodities (which are totally fungible) and there would be transparency.

If you really want to understand why derivatives are so impossible to value and so complex, try reading an actual sample derivaties contract:

ABD AGREEMENT OTC-DERIVATIVES
http://print.onecle.com/contracts/navteq/abn-amro.derivatives.2004.shtml

You will quickly see, even if you are an experience financial person or lawyer, why derivatives are so impossible to value because of their vast incomprehensible complexity with a “trigger” hinged on uncertain external financial events - and that is the most fundamental problem related to the whole $500 billion to $1 quadrillion nominal value derivatives nightmare.

The derivatives bubble is the single biggest credit bubble in the world with some estimates putting the total nominal amount of $1 quadrillion. By the most conservative BIS estimates it is well over $600 trillion. However, there is a huge difference between the actual amount of money involved in the derivatives misadventure and the “nominal” value which is like the face value on a life insurance policy. The actual money involved is more like the premiums paid on a term life insurance policy and is probably no more than 2% of the nominal value. Even at 2% that still means that there are over $12 trillion involved in the derivatives betting game. There is no question but that the derivatives gambling casino will go bust.

GTM

GTM

The best solution is to simply void all derivatives contracts and return the premiums paid on them and unwind the entire derivatives markets in its entirety. All it is financially is a betting parlor with best on which way indexes, or interest rates, or whatever will move. There is no financial value in such arrangements and all is does is to create vast risk of losses (in the guise of doing exactly the opposite by “hedging them”) and this entire derivatives market worldwide should be unwound and shut down in an orderly fashion before it implodes or explodes.

Credit default swaps, Hedge Funds, I.O.U.S.A, News Financial Intelligence, The $600 Trillion Derivatives | No Comments » November 13th, 2008

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Derivatives the new ‘ticking bomb’

PAUL B. FARRELL

Derivatives the new ‘ticking bomb’

Buffett and Gross warn: $516 trillion bubble

is a disaster waiting to happen

Today 11.13.08  Total Derivatives Over $600 Trillion

By Paul B. Farrell, MarketWatch
Last update: 7:31 p.m. EDT March 10, 2008
ARROYO GRANDE, Calif. (MarketWatch) — “Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength” wrote Warren Buffett. That was five years before the subprime-credit meltdown.
“We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly appreciative about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”

That warning was in Buffett’s 2002 letter to Berkshire shareholders. He saw a future that many others chose to ignore. The Iraq war build-up was at a fever-pitch. The imagery of WMDs and a mushroom cloud fresh in his mind.
Also fresh on Buffett’s mind: His acquisition of General Re four years earlier, about the time the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund almost killed the global monetary system. How? This is crucial: LTCM nearly killed the system with a relatively small $5 billion trading loss. Peanuts compared with the hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime-credit write-offs now making Wall Street’s big shots look like amateurs.
Buffett tried to sell off Gen Re’s derivatives group. No buyers. Unwinding it was costly, but led to his warning that derivatives are a “financial weapon of mass destruction.” That was 2002.
Derivatives bubble explodes five times bigger in five years
Wall Street didn’t listen to Buffett. Derivatives grew into a massive bubble, from about $100 trillion to $516 trillion by 2007. The new derivatives bubble was fueled by five key economic and political trends:
  1. Sarbanes-Oxley increased corporate disclosures and government oversight
  2. Federal Reserve’s cheap money policies created the subprime-housing boom
  3. War budgets burdened the U.S. Treasury and future entitlements programs
  4. Trade deficits with China and others destroyed the value of the U.S. dollar
  5. Oil and commodity rich nations demanding equity payments rather than debt
In short, despite Buffett’s clear warnings, a massive new derivatives bubble is driving the domestic and global economies, a bubble that continues growing today parallel with the subprime-credit meltdown triggering a bear-recession.
Data on the five-fold growth of derivatives to $516 trillion in five years comes from the most recent survey by the Bank of International Settlements, the world’s clearinghouse for central banks in Basel, Switzerland. The BIS is like the cashier’s window at a racetrack or casino, where you’d place a bet or cash in chips, except on a massive scale: BIS is where the U.S. settles trade imbalances with Saudi Arabia for all that oil we guzzle and gives China IOUs for the tainted drugs and lead-based toys we buy.
To grasp how significant this five-fold bubble increase is, let’s put that $516 trillion in the context of some other domestic and international monetary data:
  • U.S. annual gross domestic product is about $15 trillion
  • U.S. money supply is also about $15 trillion
  • Current proposed U.S. federal budget is $3 trillion
  • U.S. government’s maximum legal debt is $9 trillion
  • U.S. mutual fund companies manage about $12 trillion
  • World’s GDPs for all nations is approximately $50 trillion
  • Unfunded Social Security and Medicare benefits $50 trillion to $65 trillion
  • Total value of the world’s real estate is estimated at about $75 trillion
  • Total value of world’s stock and bond markets is more than $100 trillion
  • BIS valuation of world’s derivatives back in 2002 was about $100 trillion
  • BIS 2007 valuation of the world’s derivatives is now a whopping $516 trillion
Moreover, the folks at BIS tell me their estimate of $516 trillion only includes “transactions in which a major private dealer (bank) is involved on at least one side of the transaction,” but doesn’t include private deals between two “non-reporting entities.” They did, however, add that their reporting central banks estimate that the coverage of the survey is around 95% on average.
Also, keep in mind that while the $516 trillion “notional” value (maximum in case of a meltdown) of the deals is a good measure of the market’s size, the 2007 BIS study notes that the $11 trillion “gross market values provides a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets.”
Bubbles, domino effects and the ‘bad 2%’
However, while that may be true as far as the parties to an individual deal, there are broader risks to the world’s economies. Remember back in 1998 when LTCM’s little $5 billion loss nearly brought down the world’s banking system. That “domino effect” is now repeating many times over, straining the world’s monetary, economic and political system as the subprime housing mess metastasizes, taking the U.S. stock market and the world economy down with it.
This cascading “domino effect” was brilliantly described in “The $300 Trillion Time Bomb: If Buffett can’t figure out derivatives, can anybody?” published early last year in Portfolio magazine, a couple months before the subprime meltdown. Columnist Jesse Eisinger’s $300 trillion figure came from an earlier study of the derivatives market as it was growing from $100 trillion to $516 trillion over five years. Eisinger concluded:
“There’s nothing intrinsically scary about derivatives, except when the bad 2% blow up.” Unfortunately, that “bad 2%” did blow up a few months afterwards, even as Bernanke and Paulson were assuring America that the subprime mess was “contained.”
Bottom line: Little things leverage a heck of a big wallop. It only takes a little spark from a “bad 2% deal” to ignite this $516 trillion weapon of mass destruction. Think of this entire unregulated derivatives market like an unsecured, unpredictable nuclear bomb in a Pakistan stockpile. It’s only a matter of time.
World’s newest and biggest ‘black market’
The fact is, derivatives have become the world’s biggest “black market,” exceeding the illicit traffic in stuff like arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, stolen art and pirated movies. Why? Because like all black markets, derivatives are a perfect way of getting rich while avoiding taxes and government regulations. And in today’s slowdown, plus a volatile global market, Wall Street knows derivatives remain a lucrative business.
Recently Pimco’s bond fund king Bill Gross said “What we are witnessing is essentially the breakdown of our modern-day banking system, a complex of leveraged lending so hard to understand that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke required a face-to-face refresher course from hedge fund managers in mid-August.” In short, not only Warren Buffett, but Bond King Bill Gross, our Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the rest of America’s leaders can’t “figure out” the world’s $516 trillion derivatives.
Why? Gross says we are creating a new “shadow banking system.” Derivatives are now not just risk management tools. As Gross and others see it, the real problem is that derivatives are now a new way of creating money outside the normal central bank liquidity rules. How? Because they’re private contracts between two companies or institutions.
BIS is primarily a records-keeper, a toothless tiger that merely collects data giving a legitimacy and false sense of security to this chaotic “shadow banking system” that has become the world’s biggest “black market.”
That’s crucial, folks. Why? Because central banks require reserves like stock brokers require margins, something backing up the transaction. Derivatives don’t. They’re not “real money.” They’re paper promises closer to “Monopoly” money than real U.S. dollars.
And it takes place outside normal business channels, out there in the “free market.” That’s the wonderful world of derivatives, and it’s creating a massive bubble that could soon implode.
Comments? Yes, we want to hear your thoughts. Tell us what you think about derivatives: as “financial weapons of mass destruction;” as a “shadow banking system;” as a “black market;” as the next big bubble dangerously exposing us to that unpredictable “bad 2%.” End of Story

2008-2038 Investing, Credit default swaps, News Financial Intelligence, The $600 Trillion Derivatives | No Comments » November 13th, 2008

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Introduction to Credit Derivatives

Introduction to Credit Derivatives
Vinod Kothari


Life is either a daring adventure or nothing. Security does not exist in nature, nor
do the children of men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the
long run than exposure.
Helen Keller
US blind & deaf educator (1880 - 1968)
Credit derivatives, an instrument that emerged around 1993-94, is a part of the market for
financial derivatives. Since credit derivatives are presently not traded on any of the
organised exchanges, they are a part of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market.
Though still a relatively small part of the huge market for OTC derivatives, credit
derivatives are growing faster than any other OTC derivative, the reasons for which are
not difficult to understand.
Credit derivatives are derivative contracts that seek to transfer defined credit risks in a
credit product or bunch of credit products to the counterparty to the derivative contract.
The counterparty to the derivative contract could either be a market participant, or could
be the capital market through the process of securitisation. The credit product might
either be exposure inherent in a credit asset such as a loan, or might be generic credit risk
such as bankruptcy risk of an entity. As the risks, and rewards commensurate with the
risks, are transferred to the counterparty, the counterparty assumes the position of a
virtual or synthetic holder of the credit asset.
The counterparty to a credit derivative product that acquires exposure to the risk
synthetically acquires exposure to the entity whose risk is being traded by the credit
derivative product. Thus, the credit derivative trade allows people to trade in the generic
credit risk of the entity, without having to trade in a credit asset such as a loan or a bond.
Given the fact that the synthetic market does not have several of the limitations or
constraints of the market for cash bonds or loans, credit derivatives have become an
alternative parallel trading instrument that is linked to the value of a firm – similar to
equities and bonds.
Coupled with the device of securitisation, credit derivatives have been rendered into
investment products. Thus, investors may invest in credit linked notes and gain credit
exposure to an entity, or a bunch of entities. Securitisation linked with credit derivatives
has led to the commoditization of credit risk.
1 Extracted from Vinod Kothari’s Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitisation
Apart from commoditization of credit risk by securitisation, there are two other
developments that seem to have contributed to the exponential growth of credit
derivatives – index products and structured credit trading.
In the market for equities and bonds, investors may acquire exposure to either a single
entity’s stocks or bonds, or to a broad-based index. The logical outcome of the increasing
popularity of credit derivatives was credit derivatives indices. Thus, instead of gaining or
selling exposure to the credit risk of a single entity, one may buy or sell exposure to a
broad-based index, or sub-indices, implying risk in a generalized, diversified index of
names.
The idea of tranching or structured credit trading is essentially similar to that of seniority
in the bond market – one may have senior bonds, pari passu bonds, or junior bonds. In
the credit derivatives market, this idea has been carried to a much more intensive level
with tranches representing risk of different levels. These principles have been borrowed
from the structured finance market. Thus, on a bunch of 100 names, one may take either
the first 3% risk, or the 4% to 6% slice of the risk, or the 7% to 10% slice, and so on.
The combination of tranching with the indices leads to trades in tranches of indices,
opening doors for a wide range of strategies or views to take on credit risk. Trades may
trade on the generic risk of default in the pool of names, or may trade on correlation in
the pool, or the way the different tranches are expected to behave with a generic upside or
downside movement in the credit spreads, or the movement of the credit curve over time,
etc.
Quite often, the development of the hedge fund industry has been associated with the
development of credit derivatives. Hedge funds are prominent in credit derivatives trades,
particularly in case of the lower tranches of the structured credit spectrum. The hedge
fund industry represents the segment of investor capital that is least regulated, risk
neutral, out to seize opportunities arising out of mispricing, etc. As the credit derivatives
trades are almost completely unregulated and offer opportunities of short trades in credit
not permitted by the bond market, the credit derivatives industry provides an excellent
playing ground to the hedge funds.
Credit risk: the challenge of our times:
This book is about credit derivatives, and credit derivatives are devices that provide for
trading in generic credit risk of an entity, asset, or bunch of entities, or bunch of assets.
Credit risk is the risk inherent in credit, and credit is the very basis of our present society.
Our present society lives on credit, and rests (this word might be quite a misnomer!) on
credit. From governments to the marginal consumer, every one increases current
spending power based on credit. Credit allows us to consume far more than our current
earnings sustain. Therefore, credit is the very basis of consumerism. Credit is the driving
force of the World economy.
Credit is parting with value today against a promise for value in future. Credit risk is the
risk that the promise may be broken. Obviously therefore, credit risk is the most
important economic risk facing the society. Over the post 10 years or so, the global
economy has seen ballooning of credit.

Bretton Woods, Credit default swaps, Hedge Funds, The $600 Trillion Derivatives | No Comments » November 13th, 2008

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Protectionism Hurting Oil investment

Oil supply fears cloud IEA outlook

PROTECTIONISM HURTING INVESTMENT

London (Reuters) The world is not about to run out of oil, but there is a risk its reserves may not be exploited fast enough to meet global demand growth in the years ahead, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said yesterday.

The agency’s World Energy Outlook for 2008 stopped short of sounding the alarm that oil supplies may have peaked, but highlighted obstacles to accessing new fields that include the increasing dominance of national oil companies.

“Some 30 million barrels per day of new capacity is needed by 2015,” said the IEA, which advises industrialised countries.

“There remains a real risk that under-investment will cause an oil-supply crunch in that timeframe.”

The IEA estimated that the world needs investment of more than $26 trillion (Dh95.5 trillion) in the next 20 years to ensure adequate energy supplies, an increase of more than $4 trillion from estimates in its 2007 World Energy Outlook.

The executive summary of its latest outlook was released last week ahead of the full report.

In oil, upstream investment spending has risen in nominal terms, but much of the increase was due to high costs and also because cheaper reserves were offlimits to international oil companies.

Opec contribution

“Today, most capital goes to exploring for and developing high-cost reserves, partly because of limitations on international oil company access to the cheapest resources.” The gap between what was being built in terms of new capacity and what would be needed to keep pace with demand was set to widen sharply after 2010, the IEA said.

The IEA’s projections pointed to a rise in world oil supply to 106 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2030 from 84 million bpd in 2007.

Most of the increase would come from members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), whose share of world oil output was projected to rise to 51 per cent in 2030 from 44 per cent in 2007.

Outside Opec, production has already peaked in most countries and would peak in most others before 2030.

The need to invest enough to ensure supply meets demand has been a recurrent theme in the IEA’s annual outlook.

The 2008 report highlighted again the urgent need for investment, but also shifted the focus to dwindling reserves. It looked at decline rates for 800 of the world’s oilfields, where it expected the average rate of decline to increase to 8.6 per cent in 2030 from about 6.7 per cent currently for those that have passed their production peak.

Given the high cost of bringing on new output and the struggle to match supplies with demand, the IEA assumed consumers would pay an average of $100 a barrel for oil over the next seven years and more beyond that.

The agency was careful not to predict prices, but makes price assumptions in its assessments.

More volatility

Oil reached a record peak of more than $147 a barrel in July, but has fallen back below $60, a drop of more than 50 per cent in just over three months. Yesterday it traded below $58 a barrel.

“It’s short-term bearish, long-term quite bullish,” said Tony Machacek of Bache Financial.

“Whether it’s having an influence on today’s activity, I very much doubt. We’re in the hands of the financial markets yet again.”

The IEA saw more price volatility ahead.

“Pronounced short-term swings in prices are likely to remain the norm,” it said.

“The sudden drop in oil prices in August and early September 2008 — in the absence of any obviousmajor shift in demand or supply — lends support to the argument that financial investors have been playing a significant role in amplifying the impact of tighter market fundamentals on prices.”

The report’s projections for world oil demand were for a 1 per cent increase per year on average, to 106 million bpd in 2030 from 85 million bpd in 2007.

2008-2038 Investing, China's Economy, Global Energy 2032, India's Economy, OIL World Wide | No Comments » November 13th, 2008

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